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COMMENT
THE FATCA PROVISIONS OF THE HIRE ACT:
BOLDLY GOING WHERE NO WITHHOLDING HAS
GONE BEFORE
Melissa A. Dizdarevic*
In an effort to crack down on offshore tax evasion, the United States is
implementing a new set of information reporting and withholding
requirements on foreign banks and other foreign entities. These provisions,
known as the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) provisions of
the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act, require thirty
percent withholding of the entity’s U.S.-source income, unless they disclose
specific information regarding their customers’ identities and account
balances. While this may be an effective way to force foreign institutions
into compliance, it also raises questions about how it will function within
existing tax reporting systems, where the function of withholding serves a
materially different purpose.
The FATCA reporting and withholding provisions depart from the norm
of using withholding as a tax enforcement mechanism, and instead use it as
a coercive compliance measure. This Comment looks to current domestic
and international withholding systems as a point of comparison for this new
regime. By examining the objectives and operation of these existing
systems as compared to those of FATCA, it becomes clear that withholding
income serves a drastically different purpose. Existing systems utilize
withholding as a means of ensuring that taxes will be paid, while FATCA
implements it as a way to force foreign banks to comply with a set of
reporting requirements. Considering this is the first time withholding
appears to be used in this way, it is prudent to ask whether this is a
desirable use of withholding in our current international taxation system.
This Comment posits that, without significant revision to account for
conflicts arising with pre-existing obligations, converting the accepted
concept of withholding into a drastically different punitive measure is both
undesirable and unacceptable.

* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2008, Boston University.
I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Linda Sugin, for her guidance. I would also like
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INTRODUCTION
“Tentative Resolution Set in UBS Tax Evasion Case,” 1 “Deutsche Bank
Settles Tax Shelter Case for $553.6 mln,” 2 “HSBC Clients Scrutinized in
U.S. Tax Evasion Probe,” 3 “Swiss Banker Pleads Guilty in U.S. Tax
Case.” 4 These are just a few of the recent headlines from some of the most
high-profile U.S. offshore tax evasion cases. 5 As part of the recent
“crackdown” on tax evasion under the Obama Administration,6 charges
1. Lynnley Browning, Tentative Resolution Set in UBS Tax Evasion Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 2009, at B2.
2. Deutsche Bank Settles Tax Shelter Case for $553.6 mln, INT’L BUS. TIMES, Dec. 29,
2010, http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/96076/20101229/deutsche-bank-settles-tax-sheltercase-for-553-6-mln.htm#.
3. Clare Baldwin & Joe Rauch, HSBC Clients Scrutinized in U.S. Tax Evasion Probe,
REUTERS,
July
6,
2010,
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSTRE66608720100707.
4. Brent Kendall, Swiss Banker Pleads Guilty in U.S. Tax Case, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23,
2010, at C3.
5. These articles focus on offshore tax evasion cases. See infra Part I.E. For the most
high-profile domestic income tax evaders, see Top 10 Tax Dodgers, TIME,
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1891335_1891333,00.html
(last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
6. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2011 BUDGET PROPOSAL 206–336
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were brought against a number of foreign banks—UBS, LGT Bank of
Liechtenstein, 7 and Deutsche Bank, among others—for helping Americans
dodge their taxes by using fraudulent tax shelters. 8 After these cases were
brought, however, it became clear that the problem might better be solved
by prevention rather than by prosecution. This is how the Foreign Account
Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) was born.9 FATCA seeks to improve
detection and further discourage tax evasion by implementing a new
reporting and withholding system. 10 While these goals are laudable, these
new requirements are not without their consequences.11
Since their enactment in March 2010, the FATCA provisions of the
Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act have raised a number
of questions as to how the requirements will function within existing
information reporting and tax withholding systems. Practitioners have
questioned how the provisions will apply to their clients, noting the
difficulties and burdens associated with pre-existing obligations under
Qualified Intermediary (QI) agreements, and benefits agreed to under
income tax treaties. 12 The IRS has also sought suggestions from the legal
and tax communities to better offer guidance as to how the provisions will
operate with existing systems when they go into effect. 13 Because the
provisions are not yet in effect, many questions remain as to how they will
operate.
(Comm.
Print
2010),
available
at
http://www.jct.gov/
publications.html?func=startdown&id=3704 (noting the various strategies by which
international taxation can be better enforced); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, UPDATE ON
REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP AND IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 9–12 (2009),
available
at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax_gap_report_-final_version.pdf
(explaining that underreporting of offshore income is a top priority of the Obama
Administration and that the comprehensive approach includes legislative proposals,
improved tax information exchange agreements, and increased enforcement); Lynnley
Browning, I.R.S. Shift to Combat International Tax Evasion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2010, at
B3 (describing recent IRS changes geared toward stronger focus on international tax evasion
and third-party reporting).
7. 156 CONG. REC. S1745 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 2010) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin)
(explaining recent tax evasion problems with such foreign banks, and emphasizing the need
for legislation such as the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)).
8. See, e.g., Deutsche Bank Settles Tax Shelter Case for $553.6 mln, supra note 2.
9. The term “FATCA” is used colloquially to refer to the new legislation enacted as a
part of the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act, and which now comprises
Chapter 4 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). See infra note 145.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See, e.g., Alison Bennett, Tax Legislation: Dozens of Stakeholders From Around
Globe Raise Concerns on FATCA Regime, 29 Tax Mgmt. Wkly. Rep. (BNA) 1535 (Nov. 22,
2010); Micah Bloomfield & Dmitriy Shamrakov, The Thirty Percent Solution?: FATCA
Provisions of the HIRE Act, STROOCK SPECIAL BULLETIN, Apr. 21, 2010, at 1; Dean Marsan,
FATCA: The Global Financial System Must Now Implement a New U.S. Reporting and
Withholding System for Foreign Account Tax Compliance, Which Will Create Significant
New Exposures—Managing This Risk (Part I), TAXES, July 2010, at 27; Morrison &
Foerster, IRS Issues Initial Guidance on FATCA Withholding and Reporting, TAX TALK, Oct.
2010, at 2.
13. See I.R.S. Notice 2010-60, 2010-37 I.R.B. 329 (providing some guidance as to
grandfathered obligations and filing, and requesting comments on what provisions need
further guidance).
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This Comment examines the potentially problematic effects of the
FATCA information reporting and withholding requirements on foreign
institutions. With the taxation goals of equity and efficiency in mind, this
Comment focuses on FATCA’s information reporting requirements and
penalty withholding tax in comparison to some of the reporting and
withholding systems already in place in domestic and international taxation.
More specifically, this Comment looks to the goals, methods, and policies
of these systems, as compared to those of FATCA, to examine how the
burdens and policies in force will change. One example of such anticipated
change arises in the context of withholding. Under FATCA, unlike other
withholding regimes, the tax withheld is not for the purpose of securing
payment of the taxpayer’s liability, but rather as a penalty for failure to
report. This and other examples of uncommon usage of information
reporting and withholding will show how FATCA uniquely crosses the
policies of information reporting and withholding, and undercuts the
policies upon which income tax treaties are made.
Part I focuses on the background against which the FATCA provisions
were enacted. This includes an explanation of the problem of offshore tax
evasion, and how withholding and information reporting systems have
attempted to combat it. In addition, Part I provides a brief explanation of
the goals and functions of income tax treaties that have modified the
standard international taxation rules. Part II looks to the FATCA provisions
themselves—the goals and the way the provisions are intended to apply.
Part III then examines some of the problems involved in applying FATCA
considering current U.S. withholding and information reporting systems.
The first section of Part III considers withholding as a measure to coerce
foreign financial institutions (FFIs) into agreements with the IRS. The
second section of Part III analyzes whether the FATCA reporting
requirements are an efficient use of information reporting. The third section
examines the potentially dangerous reduction in treaty benefits to which
many FFIs may be entitled. This Comment suggests that, without further
revision or guidance to account for these difficulties, the use of withholding
as a punitive instrument is unwarranted.
I. THE TAX ENFORCEMENT ENTERPRISE
In the United States, collection of federal income tax is based on a
system of “voluntary compliance.” 14 This means that initially it is up to the
taxpayer, rather than the government, to determine and pay the appropriate
amount of tax. 15 However, the naturally competing goals of taxpayers
14. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 176 (1960) (holding that “[o]ur system of
taxation is based upon voluntary assessment and payment, not upon distraint”).
15. See Rev. Rul. 2007-20, 2007-14 I.R.B. 863. “Voluntary compliance” thus does not
mean that paying income tax is voluntary or optional. Id. Rather, the requirements of filing
tax returns are well established in the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. §§ 6011(a), 6012(a),
6072(a) (2006); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-1(a) (1960). Failure to meet these
requirements will have consequences. See, e.g., United States v. Tedder, 787 F.2d 540, 542
(10th Cir. 1986) (stating that “although Treasury regulations establish voluntary compliance
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seeking to minimize their tax liability, and the government looking to
maximize revenue, complicate tax enforcement. 16 The Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) has thus long been concerned with the enforcement of
taxation so as to minimize noncompliance.
Noncompliance with tax obligations can occur in three ways—non-filing,
underpayment, and underreporting of taxes due. 17 These three components
form the basis for the estimated tax gap, or the amount of tax that should
have been paid but was not. 18 As of 2006, the tax gap was estimated at
around $345 billion. 19 In an effort to close this gap, the IRS has used
various methods and mechanisms tailored to the nature of the problem. For
example, punishment for nonfiling comes in the form of civil and criminal
penalties. 20 However, the problems of underpayment and underreporting
are not so easily solved. 21 Because underpayment is typically seen as a
result of failure to set aside sufficient funds, the IRS has implemented a
system of withholding at the source.22 In so doing, the time between the
taxpayer receiving the payment and having to pay the tax is eliminated, so
there is less opportunity to fail to pay. 23 The problem of underreporting24

as the general method of income tax collection, Congress gave the Secretary of the Treasury
the power to enforce the income tax laws through involuntary collection”).
16. JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40623, TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL
TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 1 (2010). Taxpayers minimizing their liability is considered
“avoidance” and is encouraged. Id. Avoidance usually refers to legal reductions in taxes,
whereas evasion refers to illegal reductions. Id. However, it is often the case that tax
reductions are considered “avoidance” when they are actually “evasion.” Id. For more on
this distinction, and how it tends to blur, see id.
17. Tax Gap Facts and Figures, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., at 1, www.irs.gov/pub/irsutl/tax_gap_facts-figures.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2011); see also Eric Toder, What Is The
Tax Gap?, 117 TAX NOTES 367 (2007).
18. Toder, supra note 17, at 367. The tax gap has been defined as “[t]he difference
between the tax that taxpayers should pay and what they actually pay on a timely basis.” Tax
Gap Facts and Figures, supra note 17, at 1 (emphasis omitted). In other words, it is the
amount by which taxpayers have failed to file and pay taxes on time. See Lily Kahng,
Investment Income Withholding in the United States and Germany, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 315,
322–23 (2010).
19. This figure represents the gross tax gap, while $290 billion is the estimated net gap
for 2001. Toder, supra note 17, at 367.
20. I.R.C. § 6651 (detailing penalty computations for an individual’s failure to file a tax
return or pay tax); id. § 7203 (making it a misdemeanor to fail to file a tax return, supply
certain information, or pay taxes due, punishable by fine and no more than one year
imprisonment).
21. This is not to say that underpayment and underreporting are not subject to such
penalties once they have been discovered. See id. § 6654 (penalties for an individual’s failure
to pay income tax); id. § 6652 (penalties for failure to file certain information returns).
22. Historically, withholding was trumpeted as a way to help taxpayers pay their taxes,
but it was noted in House hearings that withholding was really a way to get payment from
those with little experience in setting aside finances to meet their obligations. See Charlotte
Twight, Evolution of Federal Income Tax Withholding: The Machinery of Institutional
Change, 14 CATO J. 359, 370–71 (1995).
23. Id.
24. One third of the tax gap, or approximately $109 billion, is the result of individuals
who underreport their income taxes. Toder, supra note 17, at 367.
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has mainly been framed as an issue of unequal information.25 That is, while
the taxpayer is in the position to know the transactions he was involved in,
the government seeks to obtain this information to ensure appropriate tax
payment after the fact.26 The resolution to this problem has primarily been
through information reporting. 27
It is evident from the information about the tax gap that voluntary
compliance is insufficient to secure tax compliance. Congress has thus
sought to reinforce the system with the assistance of third parties. 28 Third
parties are integral in the operation of withholding at the source and
information reporting. 29
In sum, there are two main areas in which the IRS has sought to enforce
tax compliance: first, in the voluntary nature of the payment of taxes, by
withholding at the source of certain payments to eliminate the possibility of
nonpayment; and second, by ensuring that the government has another
source of information to compare against the taxpayer’s filings.
A. Taxpayer Evasive Action and Offshore Accounts
Noncompliance has been an especially pronounced problem in
international taxation. A number of circumstances unique to international
taxation make it an attractive way to avoid—and evade—taxes. This is
evidenced by the estimation that the amount of evaded international income
tax is between $40 billion and $70 billion each year.30
There are several reasons offshore financial centers are conducive to tax
evasion. 31 First, the tax laws and philosophies of different countries can
differ considerably. 32 Some countries do not impose an income tax because
it is contrary to their policy; others levy a low rate of income tax,
encouraging foreigners to receive and keep income there.33 Second, foreign
laws regarding banking secrecy differ as well. 34 Countries most conducive
25. Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps To Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is
Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1735 (2010).
26. Id. (citing Danshera Cords, Tax Protestors and Penalties: Ensuring Perceived
Fairness and Mitigating Systemic Costs, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1515, 1543–44).
27. Id.
28. Lederman, supra note 25, at 1737–38.
29. See id.
30. GRAVELLE, supra note 16, at 1 (citing Joseph Guttentag & Reuven Avi-Yonah,
Closing the International Tax Gap, in ECON. POLICY INST., BRIDGING THE TAX GAP:
ADDRESSING THE CRISIS IN FEDERAL TAX ADMINISTRATION 99, 101 (Max B. Sawicky ed.,
2005)).
31. Richard K. Gordon, On the Use and Abuse of Standards for Law: Global
Governance and Offshore Financial Centers, 88 N.C. L. REV. 501, 516 (2010).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing RICHARD A. GORDON, TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USE BY UNITED STATES
TAXPAYERS—AN OVERVIEW 15, 17 (1981)). Banking secrecy laws are beneficial to
taxpayers seeking to avoid their resident country’s tax liability because banks would not be
required to give their account holder’s information to a foreign government requesting it.
Even in circumstances where banks are required to hand over such information—as per an
information exchange agreement between the two nations—the information would be limited
to that specifically requested. Authorities in the United States would have no way of
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to tax evasion will typically have banking secrecy laws that safeguard the
identity of the account holder.35 Thus, a difficulty arises when one country
seeks information that would require a foreign institution to violate its own
country’s laws. Some countries are known as “tax havens” precisely
because of such low tax rates and banking secrecy laws. 36
There are several common ways to avoid taxation by using such low tax,
secretive jurisdictions. Some are as simple as a taxpayer opening an
account in a foreign bank. 37 When a third party diverts payments to this
account, the interest income goes untaxed and the taxpayer does not report
it to the domestic jurisdiction.38 Similarly, the income could simply be
unreported in the taxpayer’s country of residence, and the low tax
jurisdiction would not have to report it.39
B. Harnessing Compliance Through Withholding at the Source
1. What Does It Mean To Withhold?
The question of tax compliance has, in many cases, been put to rest by
the implementation of the “devastatingly effective” mechanism of
withholding at the source.40 Withholding is a relatively simple concept. It
requires the payor to retain a part of the payment and hand it over to the tax
authorities, and is applied against the payee’s tax liability. 41 In the common
system of wage withholding, 42 for example, this involves the employer
holding back a part of the employee’s wages, and the amount withheld is
then considered tax already paid by the employee. 43
Modern wage withholding began during World War II, when revenue
needs were high and volatile.44 Withholding acted as an attractive way to
ensure collection from “new taxpayers, who had no experience filing a tax
return or putting funds aside for the payment of taxes.” 45 One year after its
introduction, praising taxpayer convenience and patriotic sacrifice,

knowing of the existence of such taxable income, let alone what information to request, or as
to which taxpayers. Id. at 516–18.
35. Id. at 516 (citing GORDON, supra note 34, at 15, 17).
36. GORDON, supra note 34, at 3–5.
37. Gordon, supra note 31, at 516.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 516–18.
40. Kahng, supra note 18, at 322 (citing I.R.C. § 3402 (2006)); see also Twight, supra
note 22, at 359 (noting that “withholding is the paramount administrative mechanism
enabling the federal government to collect, without significant protest, sufficient private
resources to fund a vastly expanded welfare state”).
41. Kahng, supra note 18, at 322.
42. See I.R.C. §§ 3401–3406 (regarding provisions of collection of income tax at the
source of wages); see also id. § 3403 (making the employer liable for payment of the tax
deducted and withheld).
43. Charlotte Twight describes withholding as the “extraction of income taxes from
taxpayers’ pay envelopes before salaries were paid.” Twight, supra note 22, at 369.
44. Kahng, supra note 18, at 322–23 (citing Richard L. Doernberg, The Case Against
Withholding, 61 TEX. L. REV. 595, 599–603 (1982)).
45. Id.
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Congress enacted comprehensive wage withholding. 46 In enacting wage
withholding, Treasury officials insisted that the withholding requirement
would not impose an additional tax burden, but instead would merely relate
to the time and method of payment. 47 However, in recognition of a timevalue problem where the government was getting the benefit of using the
dollars before the tax was actually due, Treasury officials recommended
that the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to pay interest on amounts
refunded under the new law. 48
This is precisely how the current withholding system works. In the event
that more tax has been withheld than required,49 the government credits or
refunds the balance, with interest. 50 Though the government is granted a
forty-five day “grace period,” any refunds made after that period must
include interest. 51 This provision was presumably intended to account for
the time-value problem of the taxpayer being unable to reap the benefits of
having the money in his pocket, money that was instead in the hands of the
government.
2. Current Withholding Systems
Withholding has proven to be the single most effective enforcement
mechanism for collecting taxes on income from labor. 52 The tax gap for
amounts subject to withholding has consistently been measured at less than
one percent. 53 By contrast, the percentage of income not reported for
amounts not subject to withholding, such as interest and dividends, is much
higher. 54
Despite the early resistance to withholding measures, after fifty years of
its implementation, people are accustomed to wage withholding and most

46. Id. at 323.
47. Twight, supra note 22, at 374.
48. Id.
49. See I.R.C. § 6401 (2006) (defining overpayment of tax).
50. Id. § 6402 (reserving authority for the Secretary to make credits against a taxpayer’s
liability or refunds of the balance, taking into account interest due); see also id. § 6414
(setting extent of credits and refunds to withholding agents or employers for overpayment);
Treas. Reg. § 301.6402 (2009) (detailing regulations for the administration of credits and
refunds).
51. I.R.C. § 6611 (setting guidelines for when interest is due on credits and refunds); see
also id. § 6621 (setting rate of interest to be paid).
52. Kahng, supra note 18, at 322.
53. Id. at 323 (citing INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUBL’N
1415 (REV. 4-96), FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX GAP
ESTIMATES FOR 1985, 1988, AND 1992, at 8 tbl.3, 15 tbl.7 (1996)). Professor Kahng also
explains that this data was collected as part of a program that has been discontinued, and
consequently this information is not available for recent years. Id. at 323 n.37. The program
was revived and renamed, and the National Research Program published tax gap data for
2001, where the tax gap for income subject to withholding appears to be in a similar range.
Id. at 322 (citing Tax Gap Facts and Figures, supra note 17, at 11).
54. Twight, supra note 22, at 386 (noting that as of 1980, where withholding was in
place, there was only a two to three percent rate of underreporting, but that rate increased to
nine to sixteen percent underreporting when payments were not subject to withholding).
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no longer question it as a legitimate way to enforce tax compliance.55
Furthermore, because withholding has proven so effective in reducing the
gap between the liabilities taxpayers owe and the taxes they actually pay, its
use within the U.S. taxation system has been growing. The withholding
model for domestic income taxation previously mentioned provides the
basic framework for the operation of withholding at the source in all of
these systems. 56 That is, the taxable portion of the payment is held by the
payor and counts towards the amount of tax owed by the taxpayer.57
Essentially, it is an advance payment of tax before the taxpayer has a
chance to use the money, or in this case, before the taxpayer has a chance to
choose not to pay the tax owed.
The withholding system of tax on foreign corporations and nonresident
aliens is known as Chapter 3 of the Internal Revenue Code. 58 It is directed
at the withholding agents that pay income to foreign persons, and details the
persons responsible for withholding, the types of income subject to
withholding, and the information return and tax return filing obligations of
withholding agents. 59 This chapter is the foreign tax equivalent of the
income tax withholding for U.S. persons, 60 and serves a similar purpose in
that it preemptively withholds a certain percentage of tax due on U.S.source income in order to prevent tax avoidance by underreporting. 61
Not all types of income are subject to such withholding, however.
Section 871 of the Internal Revenue Code provides for the types of
payments that are exempt from Chapter 3 taxation.62 These include interest
on deposits, percentages of any dividend paid by certain domestic
corporations, 63 income from foreign banks, and certain dividends paid by
foreign corporations. 64
The IRS has also implemented a system of backup withholding that acts
as a safeguard when a taxpayer has failed to report some information and
has been notified of that failure.65 Backup withholding requires the payor
to withhold a certain percentage of withholdable payments if: the payee
fails to give his Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) to the payor; the
Secretary of the Treasury notifies the payor that the TIN is incorrect; there
has been notified underreporting; or if the payee fails to certify properly that
certain payments are not subject to withholding. 66 Backup withholding
55. Id. at 392.
56. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
58. I.R.C. §§ 1441–1443, 1445, 1446 (2006).
59. Tax
Withholding
Types,
INTERNAL
REVENUE
SERV.
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/international/article/0,,id=104910,00.html (last visited
Apr. 20, 2011).
60. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
61. See I.R.C. §§ 3501–3510.
62. Id. §§ 871(i), 1441(c).
63. See id. § 871(i)(2) (referring to § 861(c) for requirements that must be met to be a
qualifying domestic corporation).
64. Id. § 871(i); see also id. § 1441(c).
65. Id. § 3406.
66. Id. § 3406(a).
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applies only to residents and resident aliens.67 Thus, this system provides a
sort of assurance that certain amounts will be withheld when the taxpayer
has already been notified of filing flaws.
Currently, our tax system still does not impose withholding on most
investment income. 68 Professor Lily Kahng notes that this is not all that
surprising, considering the history of objections to the extension of
withholding by banks and corporations. 69 Kahng explains that in 1982,
Congress did try to enact dividend and interest withholding. 70 However,
banks and corporations complained that this withholding would unfairly
shift the cost of collecting the tax from the government to them. 71 After
raising these complaints and organizing “protest mail” to Congress, in
1983, the dividend and interest withholding measure was repealed
retroactively without ever having taken effect.72
In the areas where it has been implemented, therefore, withholding has
been an effective way to bring taxpayers into compliance by taking control
of the amounts owed before they are actually paid to the taxpayer. On the
other hand, as it stands today, withholding on some investment income has
been rejected primarily for policy reasons like unfairly shifting the costs of
collecting tax from the government to banks.
C. Using Information Reporting To Close the Information Gap
One of the core problems in enforcing tax laws comes from asymmetric
information. 73 That is, the taxpayer has knowledge of the relevant taxable
transactions he is engaged in, and the government seeks to discover that
information after the fact.74 In order to equalize this asymmetry, the
government requires information from both the taxpayer and a third
party 75—usually an employer, financial institution, or other intermediary.76
Unlike self-reporting alone, 77 this appears to be effective in increasing

67. This is true except when the status of the payee as a foreign person or U.S. person
cannot be determined, in which case the payee is assumed to be a U.S. person subject to
backup withholding. Tax Withholding Types, supra note 59.
68. For an argument that the system should impose withholding on investment income,
see Kahng, supra note 18.
69. Id. at 324–26.
70. Id. at 325–26.
71. Id.
72. Id. Professor Kahng contends that “adopting withholding on domestic investment
income” might be an important part to “the solution of the international tax evasion
problem” because it would signal commitment from the United States to other nations. Id. at
341.
73. Lederman, supra note 25, at 1735.
74. Id. (citing Cords, supra note 26, at 1543–44).
75. Id. at 1735–36.
76. Steven A. Dean, The Incomplete Global Market for Tax Information, 49 B.C. L.
REV. 605, 620 (2008).
77. Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax
Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 698 & n.13 (2007) (quoting Charles P. Rettig, Nonfilers
Beware: Who’s That Knocking at Your Door?, J. TAX PRAC. & PROC., Oct.–Nov. 2006, at
15, 15–16); see also Dean, supra note 76, at 620 (“When third-party information capable of
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compliance. 78 This is so for two reasons: first, it gives the government a
way of verifying the taxpayer’s returns, making noncompliance easier to
catch; second, because taxpayers are aware that the government receives
this information, they have little reason to falsify returns and so they report
more honestly. 79 Thus, in seeking to close the information gap, the U.S.
has implemented a number of information reporting systems. 80
This section highlights two of the information reporting systems created
to equalize the asymmetry with respect to foreign accounts and transactions:
the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) 81 and the
Qualified Intermediary system. 82 It then introduces Professor Leandra
Lederman’s six-factor efficiency test for information reporting systems.83
These current sources of foreign account information, along with the
indicators of efficient information reporting systems, will shed light on the
obligations and benefits of FATCA’s new requirements. 84
1. Raising the FBAR
Until FATCA was enacted, and until it becomes effective, the IRS has
primarily been tracking offshore accounts through a system of voluntary
disclosure on the part of the taxpayer. 85 Enacted under the Bank Secrecy
Act (Title 31), 86 FBAR requires the taxpayer 87 to report annually any

verifying that reported by taxpayers is not available . . . self-reporting becomes far less
reliable.”).
78. See Lederman, supra note 77, at 697–98 (noting that the use of third parties has been
successful in achieving tax compliance, with a net misreporting percentage of only 4.5%
(citing Rettig, supra note 77, at 15–16)).
79. See Dean, supra note 76, at 620 & n.99; see also Lederman, supra note 77, at 697
(likening third party information reporting to “red light cameras, provid[ing] information to
the government . . . that the taxpayer knows the government is receiving”).
80. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6011, 6041–6042, 6049, 6111 (2006) (requiring various types of
taxpayer and third-party information reporting). Professor Leandra Lederman details several
other new and proposed third-party information reporting systems; these include reporting
basis in securities transactions, reporting sales on online auction sites, and even the reporting
of gifts by donees. See Lederman, supra note 25, at 1742–59.
81. See infra notes 85–93 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 94–107 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 113–22 and accompanying text.
84. See infra Part III.B.
85. In an ABA Section of International Law teleconference about the second Offshore
Voluntary Disclosure Initiative, the question of whether FATCA is simply the new Report of
Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) was answered in the negative; FATCA
requires reporting of all foreign assets, and not just foreign accounts as required by FBAR.
Furthermore, because FATCA is codified under a different title than FBAR, the enactment
of FATCA will not displace taxpayers’ obligations under FBAR. Audio recording:
Teleconference on 2011 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative and Update on the Report
of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) Guidance, held by the ABA Section of
International Law (Mar. 16, 2011) (on file with Fordham Law Review).
86. See 31 U.S.C. § 5314 (2006) (requiring individuals to report identities and
relationships of parties involved in transactions with foreign financial entities); 31 C.F.R.
§§ 103.24–27 (2010) (detailing persons and transactions subject to FBAR reporting); see
also Mark Muntean, Mark Muntean on the Perils of the Foreign Bank Account Reporting
Rules, 2009 EMERGING ISSUES 3726 (LEXIS), June 16, 2009.
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foreign accounts exceeding $10,000 (in the aggregate).88 As previously
mentioned, however, self-reporting standing on its own is ineffective.89
Consequently, even with severe civil and criminal penalties for failure to
comply, 90 these reporting requirements were ignored for years. 91
Enforcement of the FBAR is on the rise, however, and has been heralded
as “vital . . . not only in carrying out criminal and tax investigations, but
also in conducting intelligence activities to protect against international
terrorism.” 92 In its ongoing effort to enforce FBAR compliance, the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) continues to issue
regulations intending to prevent taxpayers from avoiding compliance.93
2. The QI Continuum
In 2000, the IRS initiated the QI program to further enhance the
information reported about foreign bank accounts.94 QIs are foreign
intermediaries (usually financial institutions) that have entered into a
withholding agreement with the IRS. 95 The program was created with the
intent of balancing the government’s multiple concerns—including having
a system to routinely report income and withholding of the proper amounts,
administering treaty benefits, meeting the obligations of information
exchange agreements, and promoting foreign investment in the U.S.96
Because of their direct relationship with account holders, QIs were seen as
being in the unique position to collect the appropriate information and help
the government achieve these goals. 97
The system operates on a voluntary agreement between the financial
institution and the IRS. 98 The QIs withhold and report the appropriate
87. This includes U.S. citizens and residents, as well as some foreign persons. See
Muntean, supra note 86.
88. See 31 U.S.C. § 5314; 31 C.F.R. § 103.27(c); see also Muntean, supra note 86. The
obligation to file the report is triggered when a taxpayer checks the “yes” box on the IRS
Form 1040, which asks whether the taxpayer has an interest in a foreign financial account.
Muntean, supra note 86.
89. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
90. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5321–5322; see also Muntean, supra note 86.
91. See Marsan, supra note 12, at 63–64.
92. Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, and
Why It Matters, 7 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 2–3 (2006).
93. See Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations—Reports of Foreign Financial
Accounts, 76 Fed. Reg. 10234 (proposed Feb. 24, 2011) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt.
1010).
94. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-99, TAX COMPLIANCE: QUALIFIED
INTERMEDIARY PROGRAM PROVIDES SOME ASSURANCE THAT TAXES ON FOREIGN INVESTORS
ARE WITHHELD AND REPORTED, BUT CAN BE IMPROVED 3 (2007); Gary S. Wolfe, FATCA:
Qualified Intermediary Reporting Requirements, IRS TAX AUDIT NEWS (July 23, 2010),
http://gswlaw.com/irsblog/category/fatca/.
95. Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-1(e)(5)(ii) (2010); see also Wolfe, supra note 94.
96. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, at 9–10.
97. Id. at 12 (noting that the direct relationship between a Qualified Intermediary (QI)
and account holders “may increase the likelihood that the QI will collect adequate account
ownership information and be able to accurately judge whether its customers are who they
claim to be”).
98. Id. at 10.
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amount of tax on income from the United States heading to offshore
persons. 99 This entails determining the kind and amount of income,
applying treaty benefits, and then calculating, withholding, and reporting
these amounts to the IRS. 100 Though it seems like a great burden on the
financial institutions, these institutions do receive a significant benefit in
exchange for their cooperation: they may keep their client list private.101
By contrast, nonqualified intermediaries (NQIs) must disclose their clients’
identities if they wish to be eligible for treaty benefits or other
exemptions. 102 Thus, under this system, the QIs are incentivized by the
ability to retain the privacy of their customers’ identities, while the
government benefits by receiving the correct amount of tax owed.
In their study of the strengths and weaknesses of the QI program, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that its features do
provide “some assurance” that foreign intermediaries calculate and
withhold the proper amount of U.S. tax. 103 The GAO report explains,
however, that because the majority of the income leaving the United States
goes through U.S. withholding agents, rather than QIs, identification issues
arise from the fact that these entities are not subject to the same identity
verification processes. 104 Additionally, both U.S. withholding agents and
QIs were often reporting transactions in unknown jurisdictions and
payments to unknown recipients.105 In these situations, instead of
withholding the default thirty percent, it was found that only two to three
percent was withheld. 106 The GAO recommended that the IRS determine
why these entities failed to withhold the appropriate amount for payments
to unknown jurisdictions, and take appropriate steps to recover the amounts
due. 107
The QI program appeared to be on the right track, incentivizing banks to
withhold and report accurate amounts by allowing them to retain the

99. Id.
100. Id. The treaty benefits in question are those that reduce the percentage of tax owed.
The determination of eligibility for treaty benefits is often a complicated process. Because
treaty benefits are based on country of residence, QIs receive documentation from their
clients declaring their residency. Id. These might be passports, national health cards, or
other qualifying documents under the “know your customer” rules established in the
applicable jurisdiction. Id. If sufficient documentation is not presented, the QI presumes that
the client is ineligible and backup withholding would be imposed. Id. But this is regulated
separately from typical nonresident alien income and withholding, id., because the backup
withholding provisions typically only apply to residents and resident aliens. See supra note
67 and accompanying text.
101. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, at 11.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 33.
104. Id. (noting that U.S. withholding agents might rely on self-certified identity
information forwarded by QIs and NQIs for their customers, and NQIs may not have
rigorous processes for identifying account holders, resulting in a problem of unaudited
documentation for those claiming treaty benefits).
105. Id. Additional complaints about the QI program related to the IRS processing of the
data received. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 34.
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privacy their clients so desired. 108 The weaknesses identified by the GAO,
however, were not adequately repaired in the years to follow, and abuses of
the privacy incentive and the persistence of the information gap paved the
way for the current “crackdown” on offshore tax evasion.
3. Assessing Information Reporting Systems
Not all information reporting systems are the same. As we have seen,
systems like the FBAR that rely solely on taxpayers’ self-reporting have a
tendency to be unreliable. 109 Those like the QI program, while having a
degree of “assurance” because of third party verification, still left loopholes
that allowed transactions to go to “unknown jurisdictions.” 110 Professor
Lederman analyzed information reporting systems to discover what makes
these systems efficient. 111 Because information reporting imposes costs on
the reporting party, she contends, it is not equally effective in all
situations. 112 In her analysis, Lederman identified six factors that are
indicative of whether third-party information reporting will be efficient and
effective. 113
The first factor concerns the nature of the parties’ relationship, and
questions whether the reporting party and the taxpayer are arm’s length
parties. 114 This is important because information reporting tends to be
more successful where there is a small chance of collusion.115 Lederman
also notes that systems are even more successful where reporting parties
receive a tax benefit that increases with the amount reported. 116 Second,
Lederman explains, information reporting is more likely to be efficient
where bookkeeping infrastructure already exists.117 Third, Lederman looks
to a centralization aspect; that is, an information reporting system will be
more efficient where the number of parties reporting is exceeded by the
number of parties on which they report. 118 Fourth, Lederman explains that
“complete” reporting is required for an effective system since all necessary
information must be provided in order to match the third party’s report with
the corresponding amounts on the taxpayer’s return. 119 The fifth factor
identified is the availability of few other alternatives to reporting in order to
enforce the tax payment. 120 Lastly, Lederman looks to how much reporting

108. Id. at 12–13 (describing the facets of the QI system that provided “assurance that tax
is properly withheld and reported”).
109. See supra Part I.C.1.
110. See supra Part I.C.2.
111. See Lederman, supra note 25, at 1736.
112. See id. (“[I]t matters who the reporters are, what they are reporting about, and how
much information they include.”).
113. See id.
114. See id. at 1739.
115. See id. (explaining that chances of collusion are high when the parties are related).
116. See id.
117. See id. at 1740.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 1740–41.
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on the proposed third party would contribute to the tax gap.121 This is
because information reporting systems are most efficient where the amount
at stake is great enough to justify the costs of administration of information
returns. 122
Though Lederman does not apply these factors to assess the efficiency of
FATCA’s information reporting requirements, she notes that the factors are
just as applicable to systems “addressing cross-border transfers.” 123 These
factors will be applied to FATCA in Part III, and will highlight some of the
ways in which FATCA differs from the systems Lederman describes.124
D. Agreements Open Frequencies for Tax Information
Apart from withholding and information reporting, the United States has
taken part in a number of treaties designed to increase the sharing of
taxpayer information so that tax laws may be enforced. This section
outlines the typical traits of such agreements and their place in the analysis
of FATCA as a new enforcement mechanism.
Though the United States purports to have authority to assert universal
taxing jurisdiction (that is, over all individuals on all income worldwide), it
has chosen to limit its taxation to U.S. persons’ worldwide income and to
U.S. source payments to foreigners. 125 Even with this limitation, the
possibility of double taxation still exists between the U.S. and the foreign
entity’s resident country. In order to avoid the problems of double taxation
resulting from two countries asserting jurisdiction over the same person or
transaction, the United States has entered into tax treaties.126
In the absence of an income tax treaty, the United States imposes a thirty
percent withholding tax on all payments to foreign entities or persons.127
But this entails the problem of potential double taxation—the payment is
taxed once when leaving the United States, and taxed again as income in the
“destination” country. 128 Accordingly, nations reciprocally reduce tax rates
so that the same income is not taxed twice.129
In addition, there are typically provisions for mutual exchange of
information among nations regarding payments so that tax evasion is
curbed. However, some countries’ banking secrecy laws make them less
willing to subvert their own laws to assist the United States in
Thus, information exchange
implementing its taxation regime. 130
121. See id. at 1741. For more on the tax gap statistics, see supra notes 17–19 and
accompanying text.
122. See Lederman, supra note 25, at 1741.
123. See id. at 1736 n.15.
124. See infra Part III.B.
125. See PAUL R. MCDANIEL ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION 178 (5th ed. 2005).
126. See id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. This is especially so in cases where the other country’s tax law has a different
premise than the U.S. tax law does. Id.
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provisions are lacking because they often require the United States to
request information regarding specific persons, when the information that
would allow them to know what to ask for is, by the terms of the agreement,
unknown. 131 This is why the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) has issued model tax treaties and model Tax
Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs). 132
There are certain characteristics common to U.S. tax treaties. First, there
is typically a reduction in, or exemption from, tax on a reciprocal basis; the
country of source will usually cede jurisdiction (in whole or in part) to the
country of residence. 133 In addition, treaties seek to remove the possibility
of double taxation in order to reduce barriers to investment in the United
States by foreign country residents.134 Finally, the treaties make procedures
to improve the administration of tax laws, to settle tax issues, and to provide
for the exchange of information.135
E. The Federation in Trouble
The IRS has for many years been concerned about jurisdictions with
favorable bank secrecy laws seen as “fostering tax avoidance and abuse.”136
This issue was brought to the forefront with the case against the Union
Bank of Switzerland (UBS) for conspiring to defraud the U.S. tax system
by impeding IRS investigations. 137 UBS was accused of “us[ing] a variety
of secrecy tricks to help U.S. clients open foreign bank accounts and hide
millions of dollars in assets from U.S. tax authorities.” 138 The United
States alleged that some UBS documents indicated that there were 52,000
Swiss accounts owned by U.S. persons that had not been disclosed to the
IRS. 139 These accounts were estimated to contain about $18 billion.140

131. See generally Richard E. Andersen, Analysis of U.S. Income Tax Treaties (RIA)
¶ 24.01[1].
132. See Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), OECD CENTRE FOR TAX POL’Y
&
ADMIN.,
http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3746,en_2649_33767_38312839
_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has thirty-four member countries as part of its forum
for measuring and analyzing data about economic, social, and environmental change. The
OECD uses this information to predict future trends and to make policy recommendations to
governments and other organizations around the world. See About the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD, http://www.oecd.org (follow “About”
hyperlink).
133. MCDANIEL ET AL., supra note 125, at 178.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Payments Directed Outside the United States—Withholding and Reporting
Provisions Under Chapters 3 and 4, 915-3d Tax Mgmt. Portfolio (BNA) § XXIX(B) (2010)
[hereinafter Payments Directed Outside], available at TMFEDPORT No. 915 s XXIX
(Westlaw); see also GORDON, supra note 34, at 3, 15.
137. See Payments Directed Outside, supra note 136, at § XXIX(B); see also United
States v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423-CIV, 2009 WL 2241122, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 2009)
(order denying motion to compel disclosure).
138. 156 CONG. REC. S1745 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 2010) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin).
139. Id.
140. Id.
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The case ended in a settlement. 141 In the settlement agreement, “UBS
admitted that it had participated in a scheme to defraud the United States of
tax revenues, paid a $750 million fine, and agreed to stop opening accounts
that are not disclosed to the IRS.” 142
Since then, the IRS has identified foreign withholding and reporting as a
Tier I (i.e., high risk) issue. 143 In response to these problems, and in
seeking to close the tax gap, the Obama Administration has undertaken a
multifaceted approach to “crack down” on tax evasion.144 Among the
legislative proposals intended to combat the loopholes left open from the
tax treaties and QI reporting requirements were the Chapter 4 withholding
and reporting requirements, otherwise known as FATCA.
II. FATCA’S MISSION AND TACTICS
The FATCA provisions 145 were enacted as a new approach to solving the
unique enforcement problems presented by international taxation.146
141. As part of the settlement, UBS was required to report income and other information
about U.S. clients. See Settlement Agreement, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423-CIV
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 19, 2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/bank_agreement.pdf;
see also I.R.S. News Release IR-2009-75 (Aug. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=212124,00.html. In addition, the IRS announced
a voluntary disclosure program for U.S. persons who had not filed FBAR reports or reported
income from foreign accounts. Lynnley Browning, 14,700 Americans Tell I.R.S. of Foreign
Accounts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2009, at B1. By the end of this program, over 14,700
persons had disclosed their secret foreign bank accounts, and 7500 agreed to “repatriate the
assets and pay back taxes and interest as well as reduced penalties.” Id.
142. 156 CONG. REC. S1745. Interestingly, Switzerland’s federal administrative tribunal
determined that UBS did not have to give the IRS information regarding some of the
accounts under the settlement agreement. See Swiss Court Halts Release of Some UBS
Account Holder Data, J. ACCT. (Jan. 25, 2010), http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/
Web/20102540.htm. While the question of the bank’s obligations under different nations’
conflicting laws is certainly an interesting and controversial one, it is outside the scope of
this Comment.
143. See Payments Directed Outside, supra note 136, at § XXIX(B). The IRS ranks the
riskiest transactions within the Large Business and International (LB&I) Division through a
tiering system. See Issue Tiering - LB&I, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=200567,00.html (last visited Apr.
20, 2011). Those transactions identified as Tier I “require[] a continued level of
coordination across the enterprise” and are usually identified as such because they “[p]ose
the highest compliance risk across multiple LB&I Industries and generally include large
numbers of taxpayers, significant dollar risk, substantial compliance risk, or are high
visibility.” Id.
144. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
145. These new foreign reporting and withholding provisions were originally introduced
as FATCA in both houses of Congress in October 2009. See Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act of 2009, S.1934, 111th Cong.; see also Payments Directed Outside, supra
note 136, at § XXIX(C). After some significant revisions, which included delaying the
effective date to January 1, 2013, and including a “grandfather” exception for existing
obligations, the House of Representatives passed the bill in December 2009. See Payments
Directed Outside, supra note 136, at § XXIX(C). The “grandfather” exception refers to a
clause that generally exempts certain transactions that exist before the new law takes effect.
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 767 (9th ed. 2009). The provisions were finally signed into
law on March 18, 2010, under Title V of the HIRE Act. Hiring Incentives to Restore
Employment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-147, 124 Stat. 71. The HIRE Act gives tax
benefits to employers who hire certain previously unemployed workers. See id. §§ 101–102.
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Earlier measures had failed in adequately detecting and deterring offshore
tax evasion 147 and left enough gaps to allow such grand schemes as seen in
the UBS case. 148 FATCA is intended to fill these gaps by taking a more
active approach to information reporting, and thus creating a better system
of detection, with great penalties to act as deterrents.149 Despite the
obvious benefits of taking such a hard and fast approach to battling offshore
tax evasion, efficacy is not the only concern; important foreign policy and
economic policy choices are also implicated in this complex issue.150 The
objectives of the provisions, as well as their application, give some
indication of how they will affect U.S. international tax enforcement. The
following sections describe the purpose of the provisions.
A. FATCA’s Prime Objective
The principal goal of the FATCA provisions, as with any tax
enforcement system, is to raise revenue. 151 An estimated $100 billion in
revenue is lost annually to offshore tax evasion.152 More specifically,
however, FATCA seeks to “detect, deter and discourage” 153 evasion of U.S.
taxes through the use of foreign accounts and investment vehicles.154
Because detection of evasion was one of the main downfalls of pre-FATCA
tax enforcement, increased reporting requirements are designed to achieve a
more integrated system of information so evasion can be more readily
ascertained. 155 This is because under the workings of existing treaties and
This act intends to “help put Americans back to work” and “foster economic growth.” See
156 CONG. REC. S1745. The FATCA provisions were enacted as offsetting provisions to
fund these exemptions. See Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act § 501 (falling
under Title V which is entitled “Offset Provisions”). The withholding and information
reporting provisions discussed in this Comment are only some of the provisions enacted
under Title V to combat offshore tax evasion. Other provisions include, inter alia, requiring
disclosure from U.S. taxpayers with foreign assets, the presumption that foreign trusts have a
U.S. beneficiary in certain circumstances, and requiring the treatment of dividends from U.S.
stock as income for non-U.S. persons. See id. §§ 511–522, 531–535, 541; see also 156
CONG. REC. S1745. However, a detailed discussion of these provisions is outside the scope
of this Comment. The FATCA provisions that are the focus of this Comment comprise what
is now Chapter 4 of the IRC. See Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act § 501 (to be
codified at I.R.C. §§ 1471–1474).
146. See generally GORDON, supra note 34 (describing characteristics of other nations’
tax systems that foster American tax evasion through offshore accounts).
147. International Tax Review, Chapter 4 of the FATCA: Implementation Issues, Q&A,
BRIGHTTALK
(Dec.
16,
2010),
http://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/
23955&LS%3DEMS465283.
148. See supra Part I.E.
149. See 156 CONG. REC. S1745; see also International Tax Review, supra note 147.
150. See infra Part III.
151. International Tax Review, supra note 147 (noting that FATCA intends to “recoup
needed revenue”); see supra note 145 and accompanying text.
152. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., PROMOTING TRANSPARENCY AND
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES: A BACKGROUND INFORMATION BRIEF 2
(2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/28/44431965.pdf.
153. International Tax Review, supra note 147.
154. Vlad Frants, FATCA Provisions of the HIRE Act: Possible Effects on International
Disclosure Norms, A.B.A. SEC. OF TAX’N NEWSQUARTERLY, Summer 2010, at 12, 12–13.
155. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, at 1.
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information exchange agreements, it is often the case that information must
be requested about specific persons or accounts. 156 Without proper
knowledge, the U.S. tax authorities cannot know what information to
specifically request.157 Thus, one of FATCA’s primary goals is to aid in
early detection of offshore tax evasion.
In addition to aiding detection, FATCA seeks to deter future evasion of
U.S. taxes. 158 This is accomplished not by giving FFIs an incentive to
report, but instead by giving them a disincentive for failure to report on
their U.S. account holders. 159 The “steep penalty” of thirty percent
withholding for nondisclosure 160 discourages FFIs from engaging in the
kind of evasion-aiding behavior seen in the UBS case. 161
Increased efficiency in detection of evasion and discouraging banks from
using secrecy to aid evasion of U.S. taxes are thus the primary objectives of
FATCA. 162 The provisions are geared to effectuate these results, albeit in
an interesting new way. 163 In so doing, however, they effectively ignore
established policies underlying the pre-FATCA international taxation
system and depart significantly from the “traditional” and typical usage of
information reporting and withholding. 164
B. Resistance Is Futile: FATCA’s Strategic Design
FATCA’s operation is two-pronged, consisting of a reporting
requirement component, and a penalty withholding component. 165 These
prongs are uniquely linked in that the withholding penalty is contingent on
the reporting requirements being met. 166 Essentially, FATCA requires a
withholding agent to deduct and withhold a thirty percent tax on any
withholdable payment made to an FFI 167 or non-financial foreign entity
(NFFE), 168 unless certain reporting requirements are met. 169 By having the
156. See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text.
158. International Tax Review, supra note 147.
159. See infra Parts II.B, III.B.
160. 156 CONG. REC. S1745 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 2010) (statement of Senator Carl Levin).
161. See id.; see also supra Part I.E.
162. Marsan, supra note 12, at 38.
163. See infra Parts II.B, III.A.
164. See infra Part III.
165. Marsan, supra note 12, at 40–45.
166. Id. at 40–41.
167. “Foreign financial institution” (FFI) is defined as any financial institution that is a
foreign entity, including those that accept deposits in the ordinary course of a banking or
similar business, as a substantial portion of its business, holds financial assets for the account
of others, or is engaged primarily in the business of investing, reinvesting or trading in
securities. I.R.C. § 1471(d)(4)–(d)(5) (West 2010).
168. “Non-financial foreign entity” is defined as any foreign entity that is not a financial
institution, but excepts corporations whose stock is regularly traded on an established
securities market, any foreign governments, international organizations, foreign central
banks of issue, and any class of payments identified as “posing a low risk of tax evasion,”
among others. Id. § 1472(c)–(d).
169. The institution is required to report the name, address, taxpayer identification
number (TIN) of the account holder, the account number, the account balance, and often the
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information come from the foreign institutions holding the accounts (or
owners in the case of NFFEs), the IRS would be able to verify the
information from the taxpayers by using the information provided by the
institution holding the account.
There are several ways an FFI or NFFE can comply with the new
regulations. The first is to enter into an agreement with the Secretary to
provide all necessary information about their U.S. accounts or substantial
U.S. owners. 170 By taking this route, the FFI can avoid the thirty percent
withholding so long as it continues to comply. 171 Second, the FFI can be
deemed “nonparticipating” by not entering into such an agreement, and
instead be withheld upon. 172 However, this does not relieve the FFI of its
reporting obligations. 173 Third, the FFI may choose to be withheld upon
rather than withhold on payments to recalcitrant account holders 174 and
nonparticipating FFIs. 175 This means that the withholding would not only
apply to payments to those parties, but would require the FFI to waive any
rights under a treaty with respect to amounts deducted and withheld under
the election. 176 Finally, the FFI can elect to be subject to the same
reporting requirements as a U.S. financial institution. 177 If it makes this
election, the institution would be subject to Form 1099 reporting, but would
not have to provide the account balance or value, or gross receipts and

gross receipts and gross withdrawals or payments from the account. Id. § 1471(c)(1); see
Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act: Law, Explanation & Analysis (CCH)
¶ 305 [hereinafter HIRE Act]. The Treasury and IRS intend to issue regulations detailing the
reporting of annual gross receipts and withdrawals for FFIs that do not currently track such
data. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-34, at 35–36 (Apr. 8, 2011), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-11-34.pdf. The regulations will likely include gross
dividends, gross interest, other income, and gross proceeds from sales of property, to be
determined according to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the FFI is located. See id. at
35–38.
170. I.R.C. § 1471(b)(1).
171. Id. § 1471(a)–(b).
172. Id. § 1471(b)(3).
173. HIRE Act, supra note 169, at 5.
174. See I.R.C. § 1471(b)(3). “Recalcitrant account holder” is defined as any account
holder that fails to comply with reasonable requests for the required information or that fails
to provide a waiver of any foreign law that would prevent the reporting of the requested
information. I.R.C. § 1471(d)(6). This provision was intended to provide relief for FFIs that
are unable to collect the necessary information to comply with the reporting requirements.
I.R.S. Notice 2011-34, at 19. However, it is not intended to provide a “permanent substitute
for collecting and reporting information with respect to U.S. accounts.” Id. Thus, the IRS is
still considering what repercussions should apply in the case of long term recalcitrant
account holders, including potentially cutting off FFI Agreements if there are still too many
recalcitrant account holders after a reasonable period of time. Id. The concern of choosing to
be withheld upon instead of reporting the required information is reminiscent of the
“loophole” seen in QI agreements, where QIs were simply reporting payments to unknown
jurisdictions without withholding the proper amounts. See supra notes 105–07 and
accompanying text.
175. I.R.C. § 1471(b)(3).
176. Id.
177. Id. § 1471(c)(2).
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withdrawals from the account.178 The primary factor encouraging the
foreign entities to report, however, is still the avoidance of withholding.
1. FATCA’s Withholding System
One of the biggest criticisms of FATCA—but also the most compelling
reason for FFIs to enter into the desired information reporting agreement—
is the type of payments that are withheld upon. Like Chapter 3 (also known
as “substantive” withholding), the FATCA provisions also withhold upon
payments such as interest, dividends, wages, and rents.179 Unlike the
substantive tax, however, FATCA imposes withholding on gross proceeds
from the sale or disposition of interest-producing properties from sources in
the United States. 180 This includes U.S. bonds, stocks, and other debt
instruments. 181 Thus, these provisions impose a penalty tax on amounts
that would not otherwise be subject to tax.
FATCA is not intended to impose an additional tax, 182 but it does impose
considerable burdens that make it appear like an additional tax. This is
primarily because of the types of payments subject to the withholding, but
also due to its credit and refund provisions. Like the Chapter 3 credits and
refund provisions, 183 if there has been an overpayment of tax in accordance
with the substantive tax, the foreign entity may be entitled to a refund.184
Indeed, these provisions are intended to function in the same manner as
those under Chapter 3. 185 In addition, they are intended to be consistent
with U.S. obligations under income tax treaties,186 and therefore allow for
credits and refunds for amounts overpaid if the taxpayer is eligible for treaty
benefits. This works in two ways: there may be reduced withholding or
exemption at time of the payment if proof of treaty entitlement is provided,
or the entity may withhold and apply for refunds in order to get the treaty
benefit. 187 One Commentator has also noted that “if a payment is of an
amount not otherwise subject to U.S. tax . . . the beneficial owne[r] of the
payment generally is eligible for a credit or refund of the full amount of the
178. HIRE Act, supra note 169, at 7. Form 1099 reporting refers to the requirement that
anyone engaged in business making payments to U.S. persons over $600 report on these
transactions. Id. at 2; see also I.R.C. § 6041.
179. The income sources listed in Chapter 3’s provisions reference I.R.C. § 871 and
include interest (other than original issue discount), dividends, rents, salaries, wages,
premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations, emoluments, and other fixed or
determinable annual or periodical gains, profits and income. This is income that is not
connected with conducting a trade or business in the U.S. See I.R.C. § 871(a)(1)(A) (2006).
180. Id. § 1473(1)(A) (West 2010).
181. Frants, supra note 154, at 13.
182. Bloomfield & Shamrakov, supra note 12, at 1.
183. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
184. Bloomfield & Shamrakov, supra note 12, at 2.
185. Dean Marsan, FATCA: The Global Financial System Must Now Implement a New
U.S. Reporting and Withholding System for Foreign Account Tax Compliance, Which Will
Create Significant New Exposures—Managing This Risk (Part II), TAXES, Aug. 2010, at 27,
88.
186. Id. at 90–94.
187. Id. at 98–100.
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tax withheld.” 188 These provisions appear to be consistent with the existing
systems.
By contrast, the interest due under Chapter 3 credits and refunds is not
consistent. Instead of a forty-five day grace period, the FATCA provisions
provide a 180-day grace period during which no interest must be paid.189
This is in essence an additional penalty because it does not afford to the
foreign entities the time-value benefit of the money that was improperly
withheld for an extended period. Of course, the FFIs may avoid the
withholding entirely by reporting on their account holders.
2. FATCA’s Information Reporting Requirements
The scope of information required under FATCA is great. FATCA
requires FFIs to report on foreign accounts owned by U.S. persons or U.S.owned entities. 190 The FFIs would have to keep track and report not only
when accounts are opened, but also throughout the “life” of the account.191
This would include the gross receipts and withdrawals from the accounts,
and is also likely to include transfers between accounts owned by the same
person or relatives. 192 NFFEs, on the other hand, would have to report their
substantial U.S. owners, or alternatively, that they do not have such owners;
these provisions set forth reporting exceptions for nonfinancial entities such
as publicly traded corporations, among others.193
These requirements present some concern about duplicative information
because they supplement existing obligations under QI agreements.194
Furthermore, though the IRS has provided some guidance as to how FFIs
and NFFEs will need to identify beneficial owners of accounts and other
entities, 195 the system remains “complex” 196 and rather “‘burdensome in a
way that is disproportionate to the benefit to be expected from these

188. Id. at 90.
189. Id. at 95.
190. Marsan, supra note 12, at 43.
191. Id. Initial guidance indicated that FFIs would have to report the highest month-end
balances. See I.R.S. Notice 2010-60, 2010-37 I.R.B. 329, 341. Due to the high burdens
associated with such periodic balance determinations, however, the Treasury and IRS intend
to issue regulations limiting this reporting to year-end balances. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-34,
at 34–35 (Apr. 8, 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-11-34.pdf.
192. Marsan, supra note 12, at 43.
193. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 1472 (West 2010).
194. See I.R.C. § 1471(c)(3); see also Marsan, supra note 12, at 41. The IRS indicated
that they will “require[ ] all FFIs currently acting as QIs to consent to include in their QI
agreements the requirement to become participating FFIs unless they qualify as deemedcompliant FFIs under section 1471.” I.R.S. Notice 2011-34, at 39–40. The Treasury and IRS
intend to provide further guidance as to how this transition will work. Id.
195. The IRS has provided a five-step guide on how participating FFIs should identify
existing individual accounts as U.S. accounts, recalcitrant accounts, or non-U.S. accounts.
I.R.S. Notice 2011-34, at 3–19. This guidance also provides for the kinds of documentation
upon which an FFI may rely. Id.
196. See Alison Bennett, Financial Institutions: IRS Unveils Eagerly Awaited FATCA
Guidance, Practitioners Say Many Challenges Remain, 69 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) GG-1
(Apr. 11, 2011).
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rules.’” 197 Foreign entities and practitioners alike await further guidance
from the IRS with respect to the details of the information reporting
requirements.
III. FATCA AND THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF TAX ENFORCEMENT
FATCA presents a new direction in U.S. tax law. Though its goals of
increasing revenue and bringing offshore tax evasion to a halt 198 are
arguably similar to regimes past, 199 the method for implementing those
goals departs significantly from existing systems in three ways: first,
FATCA’s withholding system is used not to ensure tax collection, but as a
means to coerce an information-sharing agreement; second, it seeks
compliance by creating a disincentive for noncompliance where efficient
information systems typically take an incentive-based approach; and third,
its U.S.-focused approach to offshore tax evasion fails to consider the
impact on existing tax treaties. This part examines these departures from
the norm and considers the potential impact of doing so.
A. Coercing Compliance by Withholding
FATCA’s withholding differs significantly from other existing
withholding systems in its usage. Though the end goal is still to reduce the
tax gap and collect revenue more effectively, 200 FATCA’s implementation
forces reporting at risk of additional taxation, rather than solely enforcing
taxation.
Pre-FATCA withholding systems were designed to enforce tax payment
by removing the time between receiving income and paying taxes.201 This
way, taxpayers would not have the opportunity to not file or pay appropriate
amounts. 202 Though this takes away the taxpayer’s time-value benefit of
using income as it is received, Congress signaled its desire to make
withholding a “fair” enforcement mechanism by offering refunds with
interest for amounts overpaid.203 Thus, withholding is typically used to
collect taxes up front rather than coerce taxpayer action in another field.
FATCA’s withholding most closely resembles backup withholding, as
backup withholding also requires holding back a percentage of the
taxpayer’s income if the taxpayer does not file certain information correctly
(in this case, the TIN). 204 However, even backup withholding differs
significantly from FATCA because of who is designated to provide what
kind of information. In backup withholding, the payee withholds the
amount from the taxpayer because the taxpayer has not properly provided

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

See id. (quoting former Treasury international tax counsel Phil West).
See supra notes 151–54 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C.1–2.
See supra notes 151–54 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.1.
See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text; see also Part I.B.1.
See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
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his or her own TIN. 205 By contrast, FATCA requires an agent to withhold
an amount from the tax-paying FFI if the FFI does not file proper
information about other persons (in this case, their customers). 206 Though
FFIs usually collect certain information about their customers, the kind of
information FATCA demands is often difficult to verify. Not only does the
information reporting impose the significant burden of determining the
extent to which customer-provided information is accurate, it also imposes
an up front thirty percent penalty for failure to do so. This is a far cry from
withholding a certain amount of a payment at the outset in order to prevent
failures on the part of the taxpayer to file or set aside funds to pay taxes.
Furthermore, FATCA’s distinct failure to offer credit and refund
provisions similar to those in other withholding systems 207 presents
additional support for the proposition that this is not a withholding regime
at all, but rather a penalty imposed at the outset. It is certainly not in
keeping with the notion that amounts withheld are intended solely to meet
current tax obligations. Rather, it imposes a sort of tax on FFIs that has
little to do with taxes they actually owe (for those are already imposed and
due), but has a lot to do with assisting the United States in enforcing its own
laws.
Even though FATCA’s withholding system provides an innovative way
to force FFIs into reporting on their customers—and in that way enhances
the tracking of offshore accounts, and eventually leads to the ability to close
the tax gap by some measure—its implementation may present an
undesirable departure from the typical withholding system.
The
undesirability arises from the indirectness of the link between purpose and
effect. If withholding is to be used as a method of enforcing tax
compliance, its purpose is better served by remaining close to that goal
directly and conforming to the identifying marker of withholding systems—
holding back from the taxpayer a percentage of taxes actually due.208 If the
intent of Congress was to circumvent potential regulatory issues that come
with placing a penalty on foreign entities by calling it a “withholding of
tax” over which the United States has jurisdiction, those issues are not
avoided here. 209 Utilizing the accepted mechanism of withholding to
effectuate results for which withholding was not intended presents a stark
problem for tax policy. Because FATCA withholding does not conform to
the standard layout of withholding systems generally, its implementation
raises important new policy concerns that should be considered.

205. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. By contrast, FATCA’s withholding
threatens to hold back on financial institutions’ income that may not be subject to tax, or that
may have already been reduced by treaty. See supra notes 62–64, 129, 180–81 and
accompanying text.
209. Cf. Marsan, supra note 12, at 40–41 (noting the difficulty of creating a rule of law
concerning foreign entities not subject to U.S. tax).
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B. FATCA’s Disincentive Decision and Inefficiency
The disincentive in FATCA comes from imposing the thirty percent
withholding by default, unless certain information is reported or an
agreement is made with the IRS. 210 FFIs are thus only forced to comply by
being strongly discouraged, or even punished, for not complying. The
necessity for this kind of approach is made quite clear because it deals with
foreign entities. Because some of these would-be reporting entities may not
themselves be subject to U.S. tax, the information reporting cannot be
demanded in a rule of law, but must instead be incentivized. 211 However, it
is not as clear why a disincentive, as opposed to an incentive, is used to
achieve the goal of increased information reporting. 212 While it is true that
there is little incentive benefit that can be offered to a foreign entity that has
no U.S. tax obligation—i.e., a foreign bank that receives investment income
statutorily exempt from the substantive tax would have little reason to be
forthcoming with customer information as there is no benefit to be
offered—it is also true that creating a disincentive that imposes withholding
on payments that are statutorily exempt from U.S. tax circles back to the
same problems of a rule of law demanding information. Thus, withholding
is here once again used in a manner inconsistent with prior law: it is being
used to withhold on payments that are statutorily exempt from tax.213 This
is not only problematic from a policy perspective, but also potentially an
inefficient means of achieving its end goal.
In analyzing the efficiency of using withholding as a means to coerce
information reporting, it is useful to recall Professor Lederman’s six-part
framework because it enables a comparison to the characteristics that typify
efficient information reporting systems. 214 The first question in the
analysis is whether there is a potential for collusion; this question looks to
whether the parties are acting at arm’s length.215 Lederman’s examples of
parties not acting at arm’s length typically include family members or
parties with other relations. 216 Thus, in the case of the parties involved in
FATCA, there would likely be little assumption of collusion between
foreign banks and their clients. This is not necessarily the case, however,
especially in light of the allegations against UBS. There, the bank
representatives were accused of conspiring with their clients so as to avoid
paying U.S. income tax. 217 Since, under Lederman’s analysis, information
reporting is more likely to be effective where parties are acting at arm’s
length, it is not entirely clear that this relationship is one that lends itself to
efficient information reporting.
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See supra notes 167–70 and accompanying text.
Marsan, supra note 12, at 40–41.
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C.3.
See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text.
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2992

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

Second, Lederman looks to the existing bookkeeping infrastructure.218
In her examples, small shops are noted as types of businesses tending to
lack the infrastructure necessary to have the information the authorities
would need anyway. Banks, on the other hand, have precisely this kind of
infrastructure already in place. Because of the well-known Know-YourCustomer and European Anti-Money Laundering provisions, it is likely that
most European banks would be abiding by some sort of client due
diligence, even without the enactment of FATCA. The burden on other
countries, however, may be very different. Here we might also wonder,
then, whether the burdens of information collection and reporting would fall
more heavily on certain countries than others. Generally speaking,
however, the targeted foreign entities of FATCA would likely be in the
position to collect the information necessary.
Lederman’s third factor is the “centralization” aspect, focusing on the
number of parties reporting in relation to the number of parties reported
upon. 219 It is fair to assume here that there will be multiple accounts to
each bank. For example, in the UBS facts discussed above, approximately
52,000 client accounts were undisclosed (and thus a relatively high ratio of
taxpayers to reporters). 220
Fourth is the requirement that an effective system has access to all the
necessary information in order to match the report with the taxpayer’s
return. 221 In this instance it is also likely that the FATCA requirements of
the account holder’s name, and the account’s gross receipts and
withdrawals would provide the necessary information. Requiring the
reporting of gross receipts and withdrawals eliminates the possibility that
the taxpayer-account holder could average out the balance over the year to
an amount approximating the amount on their tax return.
The fifth characteristic, which provides that there are few alternatives to
reporting in order to enforce the payment, is the most crucial. 222 It presents
a tricky scenario, since information reporting systems are already in place
under the Banking Secrecy Act and with respect to QI agreements. 223 In
addition, there are information exchange agreements with most of the
nations with which there are also tax treaties. Were these information
exchange agreements to be improved, it would not be necessary to impose a
withholding penalty that claws back on treaty benefits in order to close the
information gap. 224
The sixth factor is the extent to which the imposition of this information
reporting would contribute to closing the tax gap. 225 In the case of
FATCA, the possibility of closing the tax gap is significant. Billions of
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
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See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text.
See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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dollars are lost to unreported offshore accounts each year, 226 and while the
possibility of tapping into that stream of account information would be
costly to administer, it would reap great revenue in the end. Since the tax
authorities are placing the burden on the third parties to report, however, a
default of thirty percent withholding makes this somewhat of a no-lose
situation for the government. If the party reports, the authorities gain that
information about the account holder; if they fail to report on their clients’
accounts, the authorities have the time-value benefit of withholding thirty
percent of that institution’s U.S.-source income until applicable treaty
benefits are claimed, or until a refund application is submitted and granted,
without worrying about having to pay interest to the institution.
Furthermore, Lederman notes that the systems where the reporting party
is given a tax-reducing incentive to report are more effective. 227 The
FATCA provisions, as explained, provide for a withholding default to force
agreements with the IRS. This kind of “incentive” may have a profoundly
different result than if the IRS were to offer some sort of tax relief for
providing the requisite information. With that type of approach, it would be
in the best interest of FFIs to seek to minimize their own liability by
receiving the benefit of a tax reduction. Though the default withholding
provision also encourages minimizing tax liability by reporting, the FFI
receives no benefit in the end, it simply avoids additional costs.
Thus, it would appear through Lederman’s analysis that FATCA’s
withholding disincentive to not report may well be an effective way to
collect information, but it may not be efficient.
C. Set on a Collision Course with Existing Obligations
FATCA’s withholding provisions, if not properly implemented, may
have a severe impact on existing U.S. obligations toward foreign entities in
jurisdictions with which the United States has tax treaties or TIEAs.228
These provisions stand to draw back treaty benefits in two important ways:
first, by imposing a higher rate of tax than that provided by treaty; and
second, by not offering adequate credits and refunds to deal with
overpayment of tax.
First, although FATCA is not intended to impose additional tax over the
amounts to which FFIs are subject under treaties, it ultimately may have
that effect. Currently, it is unclear how FFIs will be able to claim treaty
benefits, and without proper administration the chances of over-withholding
are great. This presents a serious problem for the United States’ previous
commitments to certain nations.229 The policy choices made in creating
these treaties are undercut in favor of U.S.-centric legislation seeking
foreign assistance in U.S. tax enforcement. For example, the concerns for
double taxation are blatantly overlooked when one considers that an FFI
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may be paying a thirty percent tax where they only owe a five percent tax.
Such disregard for standing income tax treaties sets a dangerous precedent
for future legislation.
Second, in the event such a case does occur—i.e., the FFI pays more tax
than required by treaty—the credits and refunds provisions do not provide
adequate remedy for over-withholding. 230 Once again, the withholding
systems currently in place acknowledge the importance of fairness by
including interest in refunds for amounts over-withheld. In the case of
FATCA, where interest is often disallowed and the grace period for the IRS
more than trebly extended, the penal nature of this withholding becomes
more apparent. In attempting to foster free exchange of information among
nations, such coercive tactics may not be in the best interest for the long
term.
CONCLUSION
The new FATCA withholding and information reporting provisions take
a hard stance against offshore tax evasion, and indicate very clearly the
government’s intolerance for the use of offshore structures to subvert
payment of U.S. taxes. However, these provisions also impinge on a
number of important policies that pre-date FATCA. These include
honoring income tax treaties that were formed to prevent a number of issues
seen as fundamentally unfair, such as double taxation. Further, fairness
concerns are also implicated in the allocation of burdens. FATCA imposes
a great burden on FFIs that do not necessarily assist the taxpayer in evading
U.S. tax, and the creation of the presumption that all FFIs do so is a
fundamentally unfair one indeed. Finally, the withholding tax penalty
created for failing to meet the reporting requirements is a drastically
different use of withholding from existing systems. While existing systems
use withholding as a preemptive means of tax enforcement, FATCA
employs it as a coercive tool to force foreign banks into compliance with
reporting obligations. Without further guidance or revisions ameliorating
the conflicts with pre-existing obligations, extending the concept of
withholding from an accepted tax-enforcement mechanism to a punitive
measure intended to harness otherwise out-of-jurisdiction foreign entities is
both undesirable and unacceptable.

230. See supra notes 183–89 and accompanying text.

